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Monero (XMR) is a cryptocurrency, launched in April 2014, that hides by default who sent a payment, who received it and how much was sent, using ring signatures, one-time addresses and confidential amounts.
Monero (XMR) is a cryptocurrency, launched in April 2014, that hides by default who sent a payment, who received it and how much was sent, using ring signatures, one-time addresses and confidential amounts.[3]
Like [Bitcoin](/t/1497/bitcoin), Monero is a peer-to-peer digital currency recorded on a public blockchain and issued to miners through proof of work. Unlike Bitcoin, where every transaction openly names the coins it spends and the address it pays, Monero's design makes privacy mandatory rather than optional: its own project page says that minimum ring sizes were set so that ["all transactions were private by mandate"](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/).
Like [Bitcoin](/t/1497/bitcoin), Monero is a peer-to-peer digital currency recorded on a public blockchain and issued to miners through proof of work. Unlike Bitcoin, where every transaction openly names the coins it spends and the address it pays, Monero's design makes privacy mandatory rather than optional: its own project page says that minimum ring sizes were set so that ["all transactions were private by mandate"](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/).[1][3]
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*Via Wikimedia Commons: [Monero logo round](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Monero_logo_round.png) by The official Monero website, [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0).*
*Via Wikimedia Commons: [Monero logo round](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Monero_logo_round.png) by The official Monero website, [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0).*
## Origins
## Origins
Monero descends from CryptoNote, a protocol described in a paper titled "CryptoNote v 2.0", signed with the pseudonym Nicolas van Saberhagen and dated [17 October 2013](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf). The paper argued that Bitcoin fails what it called untraceability, because its public transactions let any payment be followed to its origin and final recipient, and proposed an electronic cash system built on ring signatures and one-time keys instead.
Monero descends from CryptoNote, a protocol described in a paper titled "CryptoNote v 2.0", signed with the pseudonym Nicolas van Saberhagen and dated [17 October 2013](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf).[1] The paper argued that Bitcoin fails what it called untraceability, because its public transactions let any payment be followed to its origin and final recipient, and proposed an electronic cash system built on ring signatures and one-time keys instead.[1]
On 9 April 2014 a user calling themselves thankful_for_today announced on the Bitcointalk forum a coin named Bitmonero (BMR), ["a new coin based on CryptoNote technology"](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=563821.0), describing it as a fork of the earlier CryptoNote coin Bytecoin that would start its blockchain from scratch, with a 60-second block target. The Monero project describes the launch as ["a fair, pre-announced launch of the CryptoNote reference code"](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/) in April 2014, with no premine or instamine (no coins created for insiders before or at launch), and states that no part of the block reward goes to developers. According to the same account, the founder [proposed controversial changes that the community disagreed with](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/), and a group that became the Monero Core Team forked the project; the community followed the new team, which has overseen the project since.
On 9 April 2014 a user calling themselves thankful_for_today announced on the Bitcointalk forum a coin named Bitmonero (BMR), ["a new coin based on CryptoNote technology"](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=563821.0), describing it as a fork of the earlier CryptoNote coin Bytecoin that would start its blockchain from scratch, with a 60-second block target.[2] The Monero project describes the launch as ["a fair, pre-announced launch of the CryptoNote reference code"](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/) in April 2014, with no premine or instamine (no coins created for insiders before or at launch), and states that no part of the block reward goes to developers.[3] According to the same account, the founder [proposed controversial changes that the community disagreed with](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/), and a group that became the Monero Core Team forked the project; the community followed the new team, which has overseen the project since.[3]
## How the privacy works
## How the privacy works
Monero combines several techniques, each hiding a different part of a transaction. The project lists its main privacy technologies as [ring signatures, RingCT, stealth addresses, transactions over Tor or I2P, and Dandelion++](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/).
Monero combines several techniques, each hiding a different part of a transaction. The project lists its main privacy technologies as [ring signatures, RingCT, stealth addresses, transactions over Tor or I2P, and Dandelion++](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/).[3]
### Ring signatures: hiding the sender
### Ring signatures: hiding the sender
A ring signature is a digital signature that names a group of possible signers so that a verifier cannot tell which member actually signed. The Monero Research Lab's 2016 paper on RingCT explains the idea as hiding the true source of a payment [among a group of other public keys](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf), so that no one can tell which of them actually sent the coins. The other outputs in the group are decoys, often called "mixins". CryptoNote used a "traceable" form of ring signature, which lets the network notice if the same coin is used to sign twice, which prevents double spending ([MRL-0005](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf)). The network upgrade scheduled for 13 August 2022 (block 2,688,888) raised the ring size [from 11 to 16](https://web.getmonero.org/2022/04/20/network-upgrade-july-2022.html).
A ring signature is a digital signature that names a group of possible signers so that a verifier cannot tell which member actually signed. The Monero Research Lab's 2016 paper on RingCT explains the idea as hiding the true source of a payment [among a group of other public keys](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf), so that no one can tell which of them actually sent the coins.[7] The other outputs in the group are decoys, often called "mixins".[8] CryptoNote used a "traceable" form of ring signature, which lets the network notice if the same coin is used to sign twice, which prevents double spending ([MRL-0005](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf)).[7] The network upgrade scheduled for 13 August 2022 (block 2,688,888) raised the ring size [from 11 to 16](https://web.getmonero.org/2022/04/20/network-upgrade-july-2022.html).[6]
### Stealth addresses: hiding the receiver
### Stealth addresses: hiding the receiver
In Bitcoin, payments to the same address can be linked to one another on the public ledger. CryptoNote's answer was to let a user publish a single address while each payment goes to a fresh key: the destination of each output is [a one-time public key derived from the recipient's address and random data chosen by the sender](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf), which only the recipient can recognise and spend. The paper's stated aim was that no observer could tell whether any transactions were sent to a particular address, or link two addresses together. These one-time destinations are what Monero calls stealth addresses.
In Bitcoin, payments to the same address can be linked to one another on the public ledger. CryptoNote's answer was to let a user publish a single address while each payment goes to a fresh key: the destination of each output is [a one-time public key derived from the recipient's address and random data chosen by the sender](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf), which only the recipient can recognise and spend.[1] The paper's stated aim was that no observer could tell whether any transactions were sent to a particular address, or link two addresses together.[1] These one-time destinations are what Monero calls stealth addresses.
### RingCT: hiding the amount
### RingCT: hiding the amount
The original CryptoNote design left amounts visible. Ring Confidential Transactions (RingCT), described by Shen Noether, Adam Mackenzie and the Monero Core Team in a research bulletin of [February 2016](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf), introduced a new kind of ring signature that hides amounts as well as origins and destinations, while still letting anyone verify that no coins were created from nothing. The approach built on Gregory Maxwell's earlier work on confidential transactions for Bitcoin. RingCT transactions became valid on Monero after a hard fork (a change to the network's rules that all nodes must adopt) on [10 January 2017](https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf).
The original CryptoNote design left amounts visible.[7] Ring Confidential Transactions (RingCT), described by Shen Noether, Adam Mackenzie and the Monero Core Team in a research bulletin of [February 2016](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf), introduced a new kind of ring signature that hides amounts as well as origins and destinations, while still letting anyone verify that no coins were created from nothing.[7] The approach built on Gregory Maxwell's earlier work on confidential transactions for Bitcoin.[7] RingCT transactions became valid on Monero after a hard fork (a change to the network's rules that all nodes must adopt) on [10 January 2017](https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf).[8]
Because the amounts are hidden, each transaction must also prove that its hidden values are valid, for instance that they are not negative. These "range proofs" were at first large. In the October 2018 network upgrade Monero adopted Bulletproofs, short zero-knowledge proofs that need no trusted setup, and the project reports that average transaction size [fell by at least 80 percent](https://getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/bulletproofs.html) afterwards, with fees falling too. The August 2022 upgrade replaced them with an improved version, Bulletproofs+, expected to cut typical transaction size by [about 5 to 7 percent](https://web.getmonero.org/2022/04/20/network-upgrade-july-2022.html), and added "view tags" to speed up wallet synchronisation.
Because the amounts are hidden, each transaction must also prove that its hidden values are valid, for instance that they are not negative. These "range proofs" were at first large.[5] In the October 2018 network upgrade Monero adopted Bulletproofs, short zero-knowledge proofs that need no trusted setup, and the project reports that average transaction size [fell by at least 80 percent](https://getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/bulletproofs.html) afterwards, with fees falling too.[5] The August 2022 upgrade replaced them with an improved version, Bulletproofs+, expected to cut typical transaction size by [about 5 to 7 percent](https://web.getmonero.org/2022/04/20/network-upgrade-july-2022.html), and added "view tags" to speed up wallet synchronisation.[6]
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### View keys: choosing who can see
### View keys: choosing who can see
Each Monero account has two sets of keys, and the private view key is the one [required to view all transactions related to the account](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.html). Sharing it gives someone, such as an auditor, a way to see payments coming in without being able to spend them: in the project's words, sharing a view key allows [access to view every incoming transaction for that address](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.html). It does not reliably show outgoing payments, so the project warns that a balance shown through a view key [should not be relied upon](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.html).
Each Monero account has two sets of keys, and the private view key is the one [required to view all transactions related to the account](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.html). Sharing it gives someone, such as an auditor, a way to see payments coming in without being able to spend them: in the project's words, sharing a view key allows [access to view every incoming transaction for that address](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.html). It does not reliably show outgoing payments, so the project warns that a balance shown through a view key [should not be relied upon](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.html).
### Dandelion++: hiding where a transaction came from
### Dandelion++: hiding where a transaction came from
The techniques above protect what is written on the blockchain, but a transaction can also be traced through the network, by watching which computer first announced it. Monero version 0.16.0.0 "Nitrogen Nebula", released on [23 May 2020](https://www.getmonero.org/2020/05/23/monero-0.16-released.html), added support for Dandelion++, a change to how nodes pass new transactions to one another. The project said the change [changes the way transactions are propagated to the network](https://www.getmonero.org/2020/04/18/dandelion-implemented.html), making it much harder to link a transaction to an IP address (the network address of the computer that sent it).
The techniques above protect what is written on the blockchain, but a transaction can also be traced through the network, by watching which computer first announced it. Monero version 0.16.0.0 "Nitrogen Nebula", released on [23 May 2020](https://www.getmonero.org/2020/05/23/monero-0.16-released.html), added support for Dandelion++, a change to how nodes pass new transactions to one another. The project said the change [changes the way transactions are propagated to the network](https://www.getmonero.org/2020/04/18/dandelion-implemented.html), making it much harder to link a transaction to an IP address (the network address of the computer that sent it).
## Mining and supply
## Mining and supply
New blocks are produced [about every two minutes](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/). Since 30 November 2019 Monero has used RandomX, a proof-of-work algorithm [optimised for general-purpose computer processors (CPUs)](https://github.com/tevador/RandomX). RandomX runs randomly generated code and relies heavily on memory, an approach its authors chose to minimise the efficiency advantage of specialised mining hardware (ASICs). Before RandomX, Monero used the CryptoNight algorithm.
New blocks are produced [about every two minutes](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/).[3] Since 30 November 2019 Monero has used RandomX, a proof-of-work algorithm [optimised for general-purpose computer processors (CPUs)](https://github.com/tevador/RandomX). RandomX runs randomly generated code and relies heavily on memory, an approach its authors chose to minimise the efficiency advantage of specialised mining hardware (ASICs). Before RandomX, Monero used the CryptoNight algorithm.[3]
Monero's supply has no fixed cap. Its main emission, in which block rewards slowly declined, produced about [18.132 million coins by the end of May 2022](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/). Since then each block has paid a fixed "tail emission" of [0.6 XMR](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/tail-emission.html) (or slightly less where a block-size penalty applies). The project's reasoning is that miners need a lasting incentive to keep securing the network: if rewards fell too low relative to costs, miners would stop. At 0.6 XMR per block and roughly 720 two-minute blocks a day, the tail emission adds about 432 XMR a day, a fixed amount that is a slowly shrinking share of a growing supply. Bitcoin, by contrast, has a fixed cap of 21 million coins.
Monero's supply has no fixed cap.[3] Its main emission, in which block rewards slowly declined, produced about [18.132 million coins by the end of May 2022](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/).[3] Since then each block has paid a fixed "tail emission" of [0.6 XMR](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/tail-emission.html) (or slightly less where a block-size penalty applies).[4] The project's reasoning is that miners need a lasting incentive to keep securing the network: if rewards fell too low relative to costs, miners would stop.[4] At 0.6 XMR per block and roughly 720 two-minute blocks a day, the tail emission adds about 432 XMR a day, a fixed amount that is a slowly shrinking share of a growing supply. Bitcoin, by contrast, has a fixed cap of 21 million coins.
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### Resisting specialised hardware
### Resisting specialised hardware
Monero's developers have long tried to keep mining open to ordinary computers rather than to ASICs (application-specific integrated circuits, chips built to do one hash function). In February 2018 the project wrote that it believed it was [beneficial to preserve our ASIC resistance](https://getmonero.org/2018/02/11/PoW-change-and-key-reuse.html), and proposed [modifying the Cryptonight PoW hash every scheduled fork, twice a year](https://getmonero.org/2018/02/11/PoW-change-and-key-reuse.html). The first such change came with the network upgrade that the source code set to start at [block 1,546,000, on or around 6 April 2018](https://www.getmonero.org/2018/03/28/a-scheduled-protocol-upgrade-is-planned-for-April-6-2018-03-28.html), which made [a PoW tweak to curb any potential threat of ASICs](https://www.getmonero.org/2018/03/28/a-scheduled-protocol-upgrade-is-planned-for-April-6-2018-03-28.html) and raised the minimum ring size to 7. The same February 2018 notice warned users not to use their Monero keys to claim coins on copies ("forks") of the Monero chain made by others, and said that anyone asking for this was [trying to manipulate you into being part of a large scale attack on Monero](https://getmonero.org/2018/02/11/PoW-change-and-key-reuse.html). The switch to RandomX in November 2019, described above, continued the same aim.
Monero's developers have long tried to keep mining open to ordinary computers rather than to ASICs (application-specific integrated circuits, chips built to do one hash function). In February 2018 the project wrote that it believed it was [beneficial to preserve our ASIC resistance](https://getmonero.org/2018/02/11/PoW-change-and-key-reuse.html), and proposed [modifying the Cryptonight PoW hash every scheduled fork, twice a year](https://getmonero.org/2018/02/11/PoW-change-and-key-reuse.html). The first such change came with the network upgrade that the source code set to start at [block 1,546,000, on or around 6 April 2018](https://www.getmonero.org/2018/03/28/a-scheduled-protocol-upgrade-is-planned-for-April-6-2018-03-28.html), which made [a PoW tweak to curb any potential threat of ASICs](https://www.getmonero.org/2018/03/28/a-scheduled-protocol-upgrade-is-planned-for-April-6-2018-03-28.html) and raised the minimum ring size to 7. The same February 2018 notice warned users not to use their Monero keys to claim coins on copies ("forks") of the Monero chain made by others, and said that anyone asking for this was [trying to manipulate you into being part of a large scale attack on Monero](https://getmonero.org/2018/02/11/PoW-change-and-key-reuse.html). The switch to RandomX in November 2019, described above, continued the same aim.
### The Qubic episode (2025)
### The Qubic episode (2025)
In 2025 Qubic, a separate blockchain project, turned a large amount of computing power to Monero mining. Under what it calls "useful proof-of-work", it converted the Monero it mined to the stablecoin USDT and used the proceeds to [buy and burn QUBIC tokens](https://www.theblock.co/post/366535/monero-faces-chain-reorganization-fears-after-qubic-says-it-controls-51-of-hashrate), that is, to buy its own token and destroy it. On 12 August 2025 Qubic's founder, Sergey Ivancheglo, said its pool had ["achieved 51% over Monero"](https://www.theblock.co/post/366535/monero-faces-chain-reorganization-fears-after-qubic-says-it-controls-51-of-hashrate), meaning a majority of the network's mining power, which in principle allows the holder to rewrite recent blocks. The network did see a [six-block deep reorganization](https://www.theblock.co/post/366535/monero-faces-chain-reorganization-fears-after-qubic-says-it-controls-51-of-hashrate) (the replacement of the last six blocks by a competing chain). The claim was disputed: the developer Luke Parker argued that Qubic might have had a majority of blocks found but [less than 51% of overall hash rate](https://www.theblock.co/post/366535/monero-faces-chain-reorganization-fears-after-qubic-says-it-controls-51-of-hashrate), and an analysis by the data firm Coin Metrics on 26 August 2025 found [no proof of a 51% attack](https://coinmetrics.substack.com/p/state-of-the-network-issue-326), describing the event as one that [served as a stress test for proof-of-work security](https://coinmetrics.substack.com/p/state-of-the-network-issue-326). A deeper reorganization followed on 14 and 15 September 2025: a hidden chain overtook the main one at block height 3,499,659, replacing 18 blocks, about [36 minutes of transaction history](https://decrypt.co/339424/moneros-largest-reorg-erases-36-minutes-transaction-history) and 118 transactions (a Monero observer quoted by Decrypt called it the largest Monero had ever seen); observers linked it to Qubic's withheld mining.
In 2025 Qubic, a separate blockchain project, turned a large amount of computing power to Monero mining. Under what it calls "useful proof-of-work", it converted the Monero it mined to the stablecoin USDT and used the proceeds to [buy and burn QUBIC tokens](https://www.theblock.co/post/366535/monero-faces-chain-reorganization-fears-after-qubic-says-it-controls-51-of-hashrate), that is, to buy its own token and destroy it. On 12 August 2025 Qubic's founder, Sergey Ivancheglo, said its pool had ["achieved 51% over Monero"](https://www.theblock.co/post/366535/monero-faces-chain-reorganization-fears-after-qubic-says-it-controls-51-of-hashrate), meaning a majority of the network's mining power, which in principle allows the holder to rewrite recent blocks. The network did see a [six-block deep reorganization](https://www.theblock.co/post/366535/monero-faces-chain-reorganization-fears-after-qubic-says-it-controls-51-of-hashrate) (the replacement of the last six blocks by a competing chain). The claim was disputed: the developer Luke Parker argued that Qubic might have had a majority of blocks found but [less than 51% of overall hash rate](https://www.theblock.co/post/366535/monero-faces-chain-reorganization-fears-after-qubic-says-it-controls-51-of-hashrate), and an analysis by the data firm Coin Metrics on 26 August 2025 found [no proof of a 51% attack](https://coinmetrics.substack.com/p/state-of-the-network-issue-326), describing the event as one that [served as a stress test for proof-of-work security](https://coinmetrics.substack.com/p/state-of-the-network-issue-326). A deeper reorganization followed on 14 and 15 September 2025: a hidden chain overtook the main one at block height 3,499,659, replacing 18 blocks, about [36 minutes of transaction history](https://decrypt.co/339424/moneros-largest-reorg-erases-36-minutes-transaction-history) and 118 transactions (a Monero observer quoted by Decrypt called it the largest Monero had ever seen); observers linked it to Qubic's withheld mining.
## Research on its privacy
## Research on its privacy
Monero's privacy has been tested by academic researchers. In a study published in *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies* in 2018, Malte Möser and colleagues from Princeton, Carnegie Mellon and other universities found two weaknesses in how early Monero chose its decoys. About [62 percent of transaction inputs with one or more mixins](https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf) were open to "chain-reaction" analysis, in which the real input can be found by eliminating decoys already known to be spent elsewhere; and because decoys were sampled in a way that made the real input usually the newest one, the authors estimated that guessing the newest input identified the real one with about 80 percent accuracy across transactions with one or more mixins.
Monero's privacy has been tested by academic researchers. In a study published in *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies* in 2018, Malte Möser and colleagues from Princeton, Carnegie Mellon and other universities found two weaknesses in how early Monero chose its decoys. About [62 percent of transaction inputs with one or more mixins](https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf) were open to "chain-reaction" analysis, in which the real input can be found by eliminating decoys already known to be spent elsewhere; and because decoys were sampled in a way that made the real input usually the newest one, the authors estimated that guessing the newest input identified the real one with about 80 percent accuracy across transactions with one or more mixins.[8]
The same paper set these findings in context. Its most serious finding, that most inputs contained decoys that could be ruled out, applied to transactions made before February 2017, and the authors estimated that more than 200,000 transactions from July 2016 to February 2017 might be affected. RingCT transactions were generally immune to the chain-reaction problem because RingCT arrived only after Monero had made a minimum of two mixins compulsory, so no zero-mixin RingCT inputs exist to start such a chain ([Möser et al., 2018](https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf)). The authors proposed countermeasures to the age-sampling weakness. Later upgrades raised the minimum further: version 0.11.0 required four mixins per input after a hard fork on [15 September 2017](https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf), and the ring size reached 11 and then, [in 2022, 16](https://web.getmonero.org/2022/04/20/network-upgrade-july-2022.html).
The same paper set these findings in context. Its most serious finding, that most inputs contained decoys that could be ruled out, applied to transactions made before February 2017, and the authors estimated that more than 200,000 transactions from July 2016 to February 2017 might be affected.[8] RingCT transactions were generally immune to the chain-reaction problem because RingCT arrived only after Monero had made a minimum of two mixins compulsory, so no zero-mixin RingCT inputs exist to start such a chain ([Möser et al., 2018](https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf)).[8] The authors proposed countermeasures to the age-sampling weakness.[8] Later upgrades raised the minimum further: version 0.11.0 required four mixins per input after a hard fork on [15 September 2017](https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf), and the ring size reached 11 and then, [in 2022, 16](https://web.getmonero.org/2022/04/20/network-upgrade-july-2022.html).[8][6]
## Use and regulation
## Use and regulation
The privacy that attracts ordinary users also attracts illicit ones. Möser and colleagues noted that the dark-web marketplace AlphaBay had accepted Monero, but estimated that [illicit use accounted for at most 25 percent](https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf) of transactions in the period they studied.
The privacy that attracts ordinary users also attracts illicit ones. Möser and colleagues noted that the dark-web marketplace AlphaBay had accepted Monero, but estimated that [illicit use accounted for at most 25 percent](https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf) of transactions in the period they studied.[8]
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Monero has also been mined through "cryptojacking", in which a website's script mines cryptocurrency on visitors' computers. A 2018 study by Shayan Eskandari, Andreas Leoutsarakos, Troy Mursch and Jeremy Clark, [A first look at browser-based Cryptojacking](https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.02887), examined Monero mining through the Coinhive script and similar code, which runs in a visitor's browser and mines [typically without her consent or knowledge](https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.02887), paying the website or, where a site had been compromised, an attacker.
Monero has also been mined through "cryptojacking", in which a website's script mines cryptocurrency on visitors' computers. A 2018 study by Shayan Eskandari, Andreas Leoutsarakos, Troy Mursch and Jeremy Clark, [A first look at browser-based Cryptojacking](https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.02887), examined Monero mining through the Coinhive script and similar code, which runs in a visitor's browser and mines [typically without her consent or knowledge](https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.02887), paying the website or, where a site had been compromised, an attacker.
Law-enforcement agencies have sought ways to trace it. In September 2020 the U.S. Internal Revenue Service awarded two contracts, to Chainalysis and Integra FEC, each [worth up to $625,000](https://decrypt.co/43451/irs-1-million-contracts-data-firms-crack-monero), to develop tools for tracing Monero transactions: $500,000 to build a tool and $125,000 more if it passed testing.
Law-enforcement agencies have sought ways to trace it. In September 2020 the U.S. Internal Revenue Service awarded two contracts, to Chainalysis and Integra FEC, each [worth up to $625,000](https://decrypt.co/43451/irs-1-million-contracts-data-firms-crack-monero), to develop tools for tracing Monero transactions: $500,000 to build a tool and $125,000 more if it passed testing.
Regulatory pressure has led some exchanges to stop offering it. Binance, the largest exchange by trading volume, announced on 10 February 2024 that it would delist Monero, and did so on [20 February 2024](https://decrypt.co/218194/binance-finalizes-monero-delisting), saying only that it periodically reviews each asset it lists. In October 2024 Kraken said it had ["no choice but to delist Monero (XMR) in the European Economic Area (EEA) due to regulatory changes"](https://decrypt.co/284276/monero-kraken-delisting-xmr-european), halting trading and deposits there on 31 October 2024 and setting a withdrawal deadline of 31 December 2024.
Regulatory pressure has led some exchanges to stop offering it. Binance, the largest exchange by trading volume, announced on 10 February 2024 that it would delist Monero, and did so on [20 February 2024](https://decrypt.co/218194/binance-finalizes-monero-delisting), saying only that it periodically reviews each asset it lists. In October 2024 Kraken said it had ["no choice but to delist Monero (XMR) in the European Economic Area (EEA) due to regulatory changes"](https://decrypt.co/284276/monero-kraken-delisting-xmr-european), halting trading and deposits there on 31 October 2024 and setting a withdrawal deadline of 31 December 2024.
## Future development
## Future development
As of May 2026 the project was preparing a further upgrade to its privacy design, known as FCMP++, built so that Monero could [re-use the existing anonymity set](https://www.getmonero.org/2025/08/27/fcmp++-contest-final.html) (the existing pool of outputs that can hide a real one) while moving to the new scheme. A project post of 10 May 2026 announced that the custom "unlock time" feature, which lets a sender delay when a payment can be spent, would be [deprecated at consensus with FCMP++](https://www.getmonero.org/2026/05/10/deprecating-unlock-time.html), and stated that [a FCMP++ fork date is not set](https://www.getmonero.org/2026/05/10/deprecating-unlock-time.html).
As of May 2026 the project was preparing a further upgrade to its privacy design, known as FCMP++, built so that Monero could [re-use the existing anonymity set](https://www.getmonero.org/2025/08/27/fcmp++-contest-final.html) (the existing pool of outputs that can hide a real one) while moving to the new scheme. A project post of 10 May 2026 announced that the custom "unlock time" feature, which lets a sender delay when a payment can be spent, would be [deprecated at consensus with FCMP++](https://www.getmonero.org/2026/05/10/deprecating-unlock-time.html), and stated that [a FCMP++ fork date is not set](https://www.getmonero.org/2026/05/10/deprecating-unlock-time.html).
## Sources
## Sources
- Nicolas van Saberhagen, "CryptoNote v 2.0", 17 October 2013 (annotated copy published by the Monero Research Lab). https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf
- thankful_for_today, "[ANN][BMR] Bitmonero - a new coin based on CryptoNote technology - LAUNCHED", Bitcointalk forum, 9 April 2014. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=563821.0
- The Monero Project, "About Monero" (read November 2026). https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/
- The Monero Project, Moneropedia, "Tail emission" (read November 2026). https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/tail-emission.html
- The Monero Project, Moneropedia, "Bulletproofs" (read November 2026). https://getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/bulletproofs.html
- The Monero Project, "Monero will undergo a network upgrade on 13th August, 2022", 20 April 2022, updated. https://web.getmonero.org/2022/04/20/network-upgrade-july-2022.html
- Shen Noether, Adam Mackenzie and the Monero Core Team, "Ring Confidential Transactions", Monero Research Lab bulletin MRL-0005, February 2016. https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf
- Malte Möser et al., "An Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero Blockchain", *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies* 2018 (3): 143–163. https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf
- tevador and contributors, RandomX repository and documentation, GitHub (read November 2026). https://github.com/tevador/RandomX
- Jose Antonio Lanz, "Binance Finalizes Monero Delisting", Decrypt, 20 February 2024. https://decrypt.co/218194/binance-finalizes-monero-delisting
- Adrian Zmudzinski, "Monero Dips 7% as Kraken Says It's Delisting XMR for European Customers", Decrypt, 2 October 2024. https://decrypt.co/284276/monero-kraken-delisting-xmr-european
- The Monero Project, Moneropedia, "View Key" (read November 2026). https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.html
- ErCiccione, "Another privacy-enhancing technology added to Monero: Dandelion++", The Monero Project, 18 April 2020. https://www.getmonero.org/2020/04/18/dandelion-implemented.html
- The Monero Project, "Monero 0.16.0.0 'Nitrogen Nebula' released", 23 May 2020. https://www.getmonero.org/2020/05/23/monero-0.16-released.html
- dEBRYUNE, dnaleor and the Monero Project, "PoW change and key reuse", 11 February 2018. https://getmonero.org/2018/02/11/PoW-change-and-key-reuse.html
- The Monero Project, "A Scheduled Network Upgrade is Planned for April 6", 28 March 2018. https://www.getmonero.org/2018/03/28/a-scheduled-protocol-upgrade-is-planned-for-April-6-2018-03-28.html
- Naga Avan-Nomayo, "Monero faces chain reorganization fears after Qubic says it controls 51% of hashrate", The Block, 12 August 2025. https://www.theblock.co/post/366535/monero-faces-chain-reorganization-fears-after-qubic-says-it-controls-51-of-hashrate
- Tanay Ved, "Monero's Stress Test & The Risks to PoW Security", Coin Metrics, State of the Network, 26 August 2025. https://coinmetrics.substack.com/p/state-of-the-network-issue-326
- Vince Dioquino, "Monero’s ‘Largest’ Reorg Yet Erases 36 Minutes of Transaction History", Decrypt, 15 September 2025. https://decrypt.co/339424/moneros-largest-reorg-erases-36-minutes-transaction-history
- Shayan Eskandari, Andreas Leoutsarakos, Troy Mursch and Jeremy Clark, "A first look at browser-based Cryptojacking", arXiv:1803.02887, March 2018 (IEEE EuroS&P Workshops 2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.02887
- Andrew Hayward, "IRS Dishes Out $1.25 Million for Data Firms to Crack Monero", Decrypt, 30 September 2020. https://decrypt.co/43451/irs-1-million-contracts-data-firms-crack-monero
- Justin Berman, "Deprecating Monero's Custom Transaction Unlock Time", The Monero Project, 10 May 2026. https://www.getmonero.org/2026/05/10/deprecating-unlock-time.html
- Justin Berman and jeffro256, "FCMP++ Optimization Competition Results", The Monero Project, 27 August 2025. https://www.getmonero.org/2025/08/27/fcmp++-contest-final.html
- Nicolas van Saberhagen, "CryptoNote v 2.0", 17 October 2013 (annotated copy published by the Monero Research Lab). https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf
- thankful_for_today, "[ANN][BMR] Bitmonero - a new coin based on CryptoNote technology - LAUNCHED", Bitcointalk forum, 9 April 2014. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=563821.0
- The Monero Project, "About Monero" (read November 2026). https://www.getmonero.org/resources/about/
- The Monero Project, Moneropedia, "Tail emission" (read November 2026). https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/tail-emission.html
- The Monero Project, Moneropedia, "Bulletproofs" (read November 2026). https://getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/bulletproofs.html
- The Monero Project, "Monero will undergo a network upgrade on 13th August, 2022", 20 April 2022, updated. https://web.getmonero.org/2022/04/20/network-upgrade-july-2022.html
- Shen Noether, Adam Mackenzie and the Monero Core Team, "Ring Confidential Transactions", Monero Research Lab bulletin MRL-0005, February 2016. https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf
- Malte Möser et al., "An Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero Blockchain", *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies* 2018 (3): 143–163. https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0025.pdf
- tevador and contributors, RandomX repository and documentation, GitHub (read November 2026). https://github.com/tevador/RandomX
- Jose Antonio Lanz, "Binance Finalizes Monero Delisting", Decrypt, 20 February 2024. https://decrypt.co/218194/binance-finalizes-monero-delisting
- Adrian Zmudzinski, "Monero Dips 7% as Kraken Says It's Delisting XMR for European Customers", Decrypt, 2 October 2024. https://decrypt.co/284276/monero-kraken-delisting-xmr-european
- The Monero Project, Moneropedia, "View Key" (read November 2026). https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.html
- ErCiccione, "Another privacy-enhancing technology added to Monero: Dandelion++", The Monero Project, 18 April 2020. https://www.getmonero.org/2020/04/18/dandelion-implemented.html
- The Monero Project, "Monero 0.16.0.0 'Nitrogen Nebula' released", 23 May 2020. https://www.getmonero.org/2020/05/23/monero-0.16-released.html
- dEBRYUNE, dnaleor and the Monero Project, "PoW change and key reuse", 11 February 2018. https://getmonero.org/2018/02/11/PoW-change-and-key-reuse.html
- The Monero Project, "A Scheduled Network Upgrade is Planned for April 6", 28 March 2018. https://www.getmonero.org/2018/03/28/a-scheduled-protocol-upgrade-is-planned-for-April-6-2018-03-28.html
- Naga Avan-Nomayo, "Monero faces chain reorganization fears after Qubic says it controls 51% of hashrate", The Block, 12 August 2025. https://www.theblock.co/post/366535/monero-faces-chain-reorganization-fears-after-qubic-says-it-controls-51-of-hashrate
- Tanay Ved, "Monero's Stress Test & The Risks to PoW Security", Coin Metrics, State of the Network, 26 August 2025. https://coinmetrics.substack.com/p/state-of-the-network-issue-326
- Vince Dioquino, "Monero’s ‘Largest’ Reorg Yet Erases 36 Minutes of Transaction History", Decrypt, 15 September 2025. https://decrypt.co/339424/moneros-largest-reorg-erases-36-minutes-transaction-history
- Shayan Eskandari, Andreas Leoutsarakos, Troy Mursch and Jeremy Clark, "A first look at browser-based Cryptojacking", arXiv:1803.02887, March 2018 (IEEE EuroS&P Workshops 2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.02887
- Andrew Hayward, "IRS Dishes Out $1.25 Million for Data Firms to Crack Monero", Decrypt, 30 September 2020. https://decrypt.co/43451/irs-1-million-contracts-data-firms-crack-monero
- Justin Berman, "Deprecating Monero's Custom Transaction Unlock Time", The Monero Project, 10 May 2026. https://www.getmonero.org/2026/05/10/deprecating-unlock-time.html
- Justin Berman and jeffro256, "FCMP++ Optimization Competition Results", The Monero Project, 27 August 2025. https://www.getmonero.org/2025/08/27/fcmp++-contest-final.html