For war generals on battlefields, such as Napoleon or Alexander the Great, how were they able to choose the course of action which they did in order to be victorious over their opponents who were also very capable?
This is one of the best questions in military history, and the honest answer is that generals rarely had certainty. They had information, a few mental models, and a great deal of judgment under pressure.
The main tools were these:
- Intelligence and reconnaissance: Alexander used scouts and local informants, and Napoleon ran a large cavalry screen and a network of spies. Both still fought mostly with what they could see on a given morning, so the picture was always partial.
- Knowing the enemy's habits: Commanders relied on patterns. Alexander studied how Persian armies arrayed themselves and how Darius reacted under pressure, and at Gaugamela he had his men prepare an uneven, sloping field that Darius had already tried to flatten. Napoleon counted on the Austrian and Russian habit of slow, cautious manoeuvre, which he exploited at Austerlitz by pretending to be weaker on his right flank.
- Speed and tempo: Much of their success came from moving faster than the enemy could react. An army that could march, concentrate and strike before the other side had decided what it was facing kept the initiative, and the initiative let them choose the ground and the time.
- Doctrine and training: A well-drilled army could execute a plan that a poorer one could not. Napoleon's corps system let him split his army, march separately and reunite on the field. Alexander's Macedonian phalanx and companion cavalry gave him a tool he could use in combinations.
- Judgment in the moment: Once the battle started, generals read the fight and changed course. Napoleon at Austerlitz waited for the enemy to thin their centre, then broke through there; Alexander used his cavalry to decide where the line would break.
For the opponents, the same logic applied. Darius, Kutuzov and the Allied commanders also made choices based on partial information, and many of their decisions were rational given what they knew. Victories often came less from brilliance alone than from the enemy making a decision that suited the general who had planned for it.
If you want to go deeper, Arrian's Anabasis of Alexander describes Gaugamela in detail, and Napoleon's own correspondence and the Austerlitz campaign accounts show how he reasoned before a battle.